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Potentials, limits and context factors of participation for achieving environmental sustainability

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Introducing "EDGE"

<u>E</u>valuating the <u>D</u>elivery of Participatory and Collaborative Environmental <u>G</u>overnance with <u>E</u>vidence-based Methods


Jens Newig, Ed Challies, Nicolas Jager, Elisa Kochskämper

ERC Starting Grant 2011-2016





How does participation function effectively?



Public decision-making processes

Public involvement

Collaborative management

"Good" decisions in the sense of environmental and resource protection, sustainability





Conceptual framework



Participation as three-dimensional concept

Drawing on ideas by Fung (2005), Newig & Kvarda (2012)

- Who? Scope and representation of participants (citizens, NGOs, industry, geographical scale...)
- How? Direction and intensity of information flow (information, consultation, face-to-face deliberation...)
- On what? Influence participants are given and the influence they actually exert on the decision at stake

 Power delegation

Representation


Communication

Newig et al (2017)

Case survey – methodology

The need for evidencebased approaches

- Much empirical research scattered among a myriad of - mostly casebased - single studies
- Great potential to aggregate and integrate this case study knowledge in systematic ways
- Transformation of qualitative narratives into quantitative data
- Analytical basis: theoretically informed and well elaborated scheme for analysis



Knowledge aggregation and integration: Meta-analysis

| Source of data Method of integration | Qualitative case studies (unit = case) | Quantitative studies (unit = article) | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|
| Narrative / ad hoc | Traditional review | | | | |
| Qualitative, interpretive | Meta-synthesis | | | | |
| Systematic, but not quantitative | Systematic review | | | | |
| Quantitative or otherwise highly | Meta-analysis (in a broader sense) | | | | |
| structured (statistical or QCA) | Case survey (case meta-analysis) | Meta-analysis (in the narrowest sense) | | | |

Sampling: Environmental decision-making processes

Real-world cases [N = ?]

- Public decision-making process (not mere 'engagement')
- Deals with an environmental issue
- Participatory or could have been participatory = sufficiently local process
- Case from a 'Western', democratic, industrialized country (Europe, US/CA, AUS, NZ)

Published cases [>2000]


Identified in > 3000 different texts in a two-year search process

Codable cases [641]

- Sufficient information about context, process and results
- Languages: English, German, French, Spanish

Random sample [n = 307]


Countries represented (n > 1)



The whole bar denotes the extended dataset, the dark blue area the respective share of the core dataset.


■ N = 307 ■ N = 641

Issue areas




The whole bar denotes the extended dataset, the dark blue area the respective share of the core dataset.


Types of publications



Case end dates



Translation of concepts: Coding scheme





Jens Newig, Ana Adzersen, Edward Challies, Oliver Fritsch, Nicolas Jager

Comparative analysis of public environmental decision-making processes – a variable-based analytical scheme

Discussion Paper No. 37 / 13








Institute for Environmental and Sustainability Communication Research Group Governance, Participation and Sustainability

- 315 single variables
- (Mostly) on a semi-quantitative scale [0;4]
- Covers context, process design & implementation, env.and social outputs, impacts
- Variable value & reliability
- 27 codable hypotheses considering counterfactual scenarios
- Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245518


D.II SOCIAL OUTCOMES

D.II.1 Acceptance of output

| 270. MUTUAL GAINS | s-q | [04] | Mutual gains: Degree to which win-win solutions were developed during the <u>DMP</u> (i. degree to which the output provided mutual gains). | e. |
|-------------------|-----|----------------------------|---|-----|
| | | | Win-win (or Pareto optimal) solutions are those that provide gains (or at least: no los es) to all involved parties. These are always positive-sum solutions compared to the non-collaborative alternative. Win-win solutions include solutions where compensati is provided to those who would otherwise suffer losses. Win-win solutions are not necessarily limited to the environmental issue at hand, but may be linked to alternati issues and competing interests on and off the table, as well as to future decisions (Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000: 50). | ion |
| | | | 0 = output provided no mutual gains; 2 = output provided moderate gains for some stakeholder groups; 4 = output provided high gains for all stakeholder groups. | |
| | | | Code -99 if there was no output. | |
| 271. CONFL RESOL | s-q | [-44] (99) | Conflict resolution: Degree to which an existing conflict was resolved or worsened or new conflict developed. Consider the nature of change in any pre-existing conflict of values and/or distribution identified in variables 77. CONFL VALUES and 78. CONFL DISTN | |
| | | | -4 = conflict severely intensified or developed in the first place; 0 = degree of conflict did not change during the process; | |
| | | | 4 = existing conflict was fully resolved. | |
| 272. ADDR ACCEP | s-q | [02] | Addressees acceptance: Acceptance of the decision on the part of those actors who | |
| | | | had to comply with and implement the decision (i.e. those actors coded in 222. POL ADDR). | |
| | | | O – decision was ennesed. | |




Implementation: Coding procedure




Descriptive results

Studied cases...

- have on average 15'817 words
- were coded by a total of 22 different coders
- present public decision-making processes with a tangible output (only 19 out of 307 do not produce an output)
- are on average 45 months long (DMP)



Average rationales for the chosen process type



Statistical analysis

N = 307

Regression analysis: **Environmental** quality of the output

| | (1) | (2) |
|--------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| Communication (PCA) | 0.298*** | 0.207*** |
| Power Delegation (PCA) | 0.383*** | 0.302*** |
| Repr. Private | -0.040 | |
| Repr. Civic | 0.058 | |
| Repr. Citizens | -0.038 | |
| Repr. Nature | | 0.238*** |
| Repr. Exploitation | | -0.240*** |
| Authority Interest Nature | | |
| Environmental Rationale | | |
| NIMBY | | |
| Previous Attempt | | |
| Bottom-up triggered | | |
| Europe | | |
| NIMBY x Repr. Citizens | | |
| Bottom-up trigg x Repr. Priv. | | |
| Prev. Attempt x Communic. | | |
| Europe x Power Delegation | | |
| Constant | -0.000 | 0.000 |
| Observations | 279 | 279 |
| R ² | 0.246 | 0.334 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.232 | 0.324 |

Regression analysis: **Environmental** quality of the output

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|-------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Communication (PCA) | 0.298*** | 0.207*** | 0.144** |
| Power Delegation (PCA) | 0.383*** | 0.302*** | 0.217*** |
| Repr. Private | -0.040 | | |
| Repr. Civic | 0.058 | | |
| Repr. Citizens | -0.038 | | |
| Repr. Nature | | 0.238*** | 0.074 |
| Repr. Exploitation | | -0.240*** | -0.107* |
| Authority Interest Nature | | | 0.212*** |
| Environmental Rationale | | | 0.281*** |
| NIMBY | | | |
| Previous Attempt | | | |
| Bottom-up triggered | | | |
| Europe | | | |
| NIMBY x Repr. Citizens | | | |
| Bottom-up trigg x Repr. Priv. | | | |
| Prev. Attempt x Communic. | | | |
| Europe x Power Delegation | | | |
| Constant | -0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Observations | 279 | 279 | 279 |
| R ² | 0.246 | 0.334 | 0.446 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.232 | 0.324 | 0.434 |

Regression analysis: Environmental quality of the output (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(9)

| Communication (PCA) | 0.298*** | 0.207*** | 0.144** | 0.141** | 0.144** | 0.150** | 0.150** | 0.142** | 0.136** | |
|--------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| Power Delegation (PCA) | 0.383*** | 0.302*** | 0.217*** | 0.221*** | 0.225*** | 0.219*** | 0.210*** | 0.203*** | 0.210*** | |
| Repr. Private | -0.040 | | | | | | | | | |
| Repr. Civic | 0.058 | | | | | | | | | |
| Repr. Citizens | -0.038 | | | | | | | | | |
| Repr. Nature | | 0.238*** | 0.074 | 0.075 | 0.073 | 0.070 | 0.052 | 0.046 | 0.052 | |
| Repr. Exploitation | | -0.240*** | -0.107* | -0.110* | -0.116* | -0.126* | -0.128* | -0.130** | -0.131** | |
| Authority Interest Nature | | | 0.212*** | 0.196*** | 0.192** | 0.181** | 0.176** | 0.179** | 0.193*** | |
| Environmental Rationale | | | 0.281*** | 0.277*** | 0.276*** | 0.279*** | 0.278*** | 0.287*** | 0.295*** | |
| NIMBY | | | | -0.019 | -0.011 | -0.035 | -0.042 | -0.040 | -0.032 | |
| Previous Attempt | | | | -0.007 | -0.014 | -0.025 | -0.016 | -0.013 | -0.0004 | |
| Bottom-up triggered | | | | -0.050 | -0.052 | -0.043 | -0.050 | -0.067 | -0.066 | |
| Europe | | | | | -0.042 | -0.053 | -0.049 | -0.052 | -0.050 | |
| NIMBY x Repr. Citizens | | | | | | 0.131** | 0.134** | 0.128** | 0.124** | |
| Bottom-up trigg x Repr. Priv. | | | | | | | -0.111* | -0.115* | -0.109* | |
| Prev. Attempt x Communic. | | | | | | | | 0.106* | 0.103* | |
| Europe x Power Delegation | | | | | | | | | 0.110* | |

0.000

279

0.449

0.430

0.000

279

0.450

0.430

-0.023

279

0.465

0.443

-0.031

279

0.477

0.453

-0.034

279

0.487

0.462

-0.034

279

0.498

0.471

Constant

 R^2

Observations

Adjusted R²

-0.000

279

0.246

0.232

0.000

279

0.334

0.324

0.000

279

0.446

0.434

Regression analysis: <u>Human health</u> quality of the output

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|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|---------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Communication (PCA) | 0.126 | 0.122* | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.034 | 0.046 | 0.055 | 0.042 | 0.039 |
| Power Delegation (PCA) | 0.263*** | 0.296*** | 0.210*** | 0.209*** | 0.212*** | 0.210*** | 0.204*** | 0.198*** | 0.204*** |
| Repr. Private | 0.0002 | | | | | | -0.061 | -0.066 | -0.053 |
| Repr. Civic | 0.043 | | | | | | | | |
| Repr. Citizens | 0.105 | | | | | | | | |
| Repr. Health | | 0.340*** | 0.260*** | 0.269*** | 0.267*** | 0.263*** | 0.275*** | 0.292*** | 0.288*** |
| Repr. Exploitation | | -0.218*** | -0.110* | -0.109* | -0.114* | -0.117* | -0.101 | -0.105 | -0.112* |
| Authority Interest Health | | | 0.218*** | 0.206** | 0.206** | 0.221*** | 0.211*** | 0.215*** | 0.208*** |
| Environmental Rationale | | | 0.213*** | 0.215*** | 0.214*** | 0.200*** | 0.202*** | 0.210*** | 0.221*** |
| NIMBY | | | | -0.035 | -0.027 | 0.028 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.009 |
| Previous Attempt | | | | -0.060 | -0.066 | -0.047 | -0.041 | -0.036 | -0.028 |
| Bottom-up triggered | | | | 0.024 | 0.022 | 0.011 | 0.005 | -0.012 | -0.012 |
| Europe | | | | | -0.035 | -0.048 | -0.041 | -0.044 | -0.042 |
| NIMBY x Power Delegation | | | | | | 0.206*** | 0.198*** | 0.203*** | 0.184*** |
| Bottom-up trigg. x Repr. Prv | | | | | | | -0.112* | -0.115* | -0.112* |
| Previous Attempt x Comm. | | | | | | | | 0.111* | 0.107* |
| Europe x Power Delegation | | | | | | | | | 0.087 |
| Constant | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.041 | 0.040 | 0.034 |
| Observations | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 |
| R ² | 0.117 | 0.233 | 0.329 | 0.334 | 0.335 | 0.374 | 0.387 | 0.398 | 0.404 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.101 | 0.222 | 0.314 | 0.312 | 0.310 | 0.348 | 0.356 | 0.366 | 0.370 |

Key messages

- Power Delegation with very strong influence on environmental and health standards of the output.
- Representation of interests rather than social sectors as predictor for the quality of output.
- Communication influential for social outcomes, but also for the environmental standard of the output.
- Difference between environmental and human health dimensions.
- Importance of contextual conditions, e.g. role of citizen participation in NIMBY situations

Cited literature

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- Newig, J., E. Challies, N.W. Jager, E. Kochskämper and A. Adzersen (2017): The environmental performance of participatory and collaborative governance: A causal framework for analysis; Policy Studies Journal (Open Acces: *onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/psj.12209/full)*.